The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives From Russia by James Clay Moltz & Alexandre Y. Mansourov

Author:James Clay Moltz & Alexandre Y. Mansourov [Moltz, James Clay & Mansourov, Alexandre Y.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Technology & Engineering, General, Political Science, Military Science
ISBN: 9780415923705
Google: 1qA4kuu9mYAC
Publisher: Psychology Press
Published: 2000-01-15T11:41:49+00:00

V. Kryuchkov

Chairman of the KGB of the USSR17

The above-mentioned document, written by highly qualified professionals, contains no references to the fundamental differences between such phases of producing nuclear weapons as laboratory research, field tests, and serial manufacture of weapons. This is not accidental. By combining different stages of developing nuclear weapons, despite the fact that each of them requies a different means and time, the KGB was trying to use every opportunity to remind Soviet leaders that it was the most zealous guardian of the national interests of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, any unbiased observer could easily see that for a long time—especially before North Korea's ratification of the IAEA safeguards agreement in April 1992—the North Koreans had an opportunity to undertake (if they had actually been ready) at least one underground test explosion in one of their underground shelters. Such an action would have brought them much greater geopolitical dividends than the tactics of indecisiveness and delay.

These data suggest that the KGB may have fallen victim to an intricately calculated leak of disinformation from skilled North Korean sources. Despite its acclaimed professionalism, Soviet political intelligence was not immune to serious miscalculations or even obvious misperceptions. A former KGB resident in Japan, S. Levchenko, who defected to the West, makes an interesting admission in this connection in his memoirs: " As some experts have admitted, Soviet and later Russian disinformation sometimes appeared on the table of the U.S. Presidents." In turn, " similar disinformation was sent to Moscow by Soviet intelligence agents themselves. This practice flourished especially in the Brezhnev era. then-KGB chief Andropov and other Politburo members often were fed with data that was to their advantage and caressed their ear. The truth was told only by the few who dared to speak up. To a large extent, it did not reach ‘the top.’ " 18

Returning to the main theme of this chapter, one cannot help concluding that not only was the Soviet Union deceived, but the United States was also misled by the North Korean nuclear bluff of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The latter point is illustrated by the exaggerated estimates and contradictory reports concerning North Koreas military nuclear capabilities made by some " sufficiently reliable" sources in the United States.

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